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Vaccines are different from most medicines in that they are administered to large and mostly healthy
populations including infants and children, so there is a low tolerance for potential risks or side-
effects. In addition, the long-term benefits of immunisation in reducing or eliminating infectious diseases
may induce complacency due to the absence of cases. However, as demonstrated in recent measles out-
breaks in Europe and United States, reappearance of the disease occurs as soon as vaccine coverage falls.
Unfounded vaccine scares such as those associating the combined measles-mumps-rubella vaccine with
autism, and whole-cell pertussis vaccines with encephalopathy, can also have massive impacts, resulting
in reduced vaccine uptake and disease resurgence. The safety assessment of vaccines is exhaustive and
continuous; beginning with non-clinical evaluation of their individual components in terms of purity,
stability and sterility, continuing throughout the clinical development phase and entire duration of use
of the vaccine; including post-approval. The breadth and depth of safety assessments conducted at mul-
tiple levels by a range of independent organizations increases confidence in the rigour with which any
potential risks or side-effects are investigated and managed. Industry, regulatory agencies, academia,
the medical community and the general public all play a role in monitoring vaccine safety. Within these
stakeholder groups, the healthcare professional and vaccine provider have key roles in the prevention,
identification, investigation and management of adverse events following immunisation (AEFI).
Guidelines and algorithms aid in determining whether AEFI may have been caused by the vaccine, or
whether it is coincidental to it. Healthcare providers are encouraged to rigorously investigate AEFIs
and to report them via local reporting processes. The ultimate objective for all parties is to ensure
vaccines have a favourable benefit-risk profile.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Vaccines are among the most successful and cost-effective pub-
lic health tools. Not only do vaccines prevent the vaccinated indi-
vidual from developing a potentially serious illness, but they also
help protect entire communities by reducing the spread of infec-
tious agents (herd protection). Vaccines are unique as they are
administered to large cohorts of mostly healthy individuals; often
infants and small children. Therefore, it is unacceptable for vacci-
nes to induce a significant burden of side effects, even where the
illness itself can produce severe or fatal side effects. Acceptance
of some side effects in vaccines depends on their frequency and
severity, and may vary with time based on how the side-effect
Table 1
Classification of adverse events following immunisation (AEFI).
Vaccine reaction or
vaccine-induced
event
 Event caused or precipitated by the vaccine
when given correctly (e.g., pain, redness,
swelling, fever)
 Caused by inherent properties of the vaccine
(e.g., presence of an adjuvant inducing injec-
tion site reactions due to activation of local
inflammatory response, or replicating live
attenuated viruses such as MMR vaccines
inducing mild fever and/or rash about 10 days
after immunisation, or paralytic polio follow-
ing live-attenuated poliovirus vaccines)
Immunisation errors  Event caused by an error in vaccine prepara-
tion, handling, or maladministration (e.g., for
the DTPa-IPV-HBV/Hib vaccine, injecting a
fully liquid pentavalent DTPa-IPV-HBV part
without reconstituting it with a lyophilised
Hib, or oral rotavirus vaccine injected
intramuscularly)
Coincidental event  Event that happens shortly after immunisa-
tion but is not caused by the vaccine (chance
association, e.g., flu-like symptoms due to a
rhinovirus infection after influenza
immunisation)
Immunisation anxiety
reaction
 Event resulting from anxiety about, or pain
from, the injection itself rather than the vac-
cine (e.g., syncope, panic attack)
Vaccine failure  Event indicating lack of efficacy/effectiveness
(e.g., due to failure to respect cold chain
requirements)
Unknown  Cause cannot be determined
DTPa-IPV-HBV/Hib – combined diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis-inactivated
poliovirus-hepatitis b-Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccine.
A. Di Pasquale et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 6672–6680 6673compares with the symptoms induced by the illness. As first-hand
experience of the vaccine-preventable disease fades, even mild
side-effects may be viewed as unacceptable by the public and by
vaccine providers alike.
No drug, medical procedure or immunisation can be ascribed as
totally risk free. If there are known risks (untoward occurrences for
which there is a potential or identified association with the medic-
inal product [1]), these are described in the Prescribing Informa-
tion. For vaccines, active expansion of the safety information
base continues to ensure that the benefits always measurably
exceed any potential emerging risks. The balance of benefits and
risks is dynamic and may change over time as new data emerge.
The benefit-risk balance weighs the benefits of immunisation
towards society (such as the prevention of epidemics, reductions
in costs associated with treatment, and improved productivity),
and benefits to the individual (prevention of disease and its poten-
tial sequelae), against the risks to the individual who might suffer
an adverse vaccine reaction [2]. To facilitate this assessment,
extensive efforts are undertaken to evaluate a vaccine’s safety from
early development through its entire duration of use. At licensure,
surveillance activities are put into place to continue monitoring
safety and disease epidemiology, and to supply reliable and up-
to-date information to maintain public confidence in immunisa-
tion programmes.
Adverse events (AEs) occurring after immunisation, regardless
of whether they were or were not caused by the vaccine, are
referred to as ‘adverse events following immunisation’ (AEFI)
(Table 1). Most vaccines are provided as injections and the most
common AEFI are symptoms that occur at the injection site (pain,
redness, swelling), or common systemic symptoms such as fever or
myalgia. These events are reported as side-effects of most injected
vaccines and are generally mild and self-limiting. Occasionally,
unexpected AEs or rare serious AEs may occur. Some events, such
as anaphylaxis, usually occur rapidly after immunisation and
require swift recognition and management. Others may occur days
or weeks after immunisation; these require comprehensive inves-
tigation to distinguish those events that can be potentially causally
related to immunisation, and those which are merely coincidental
to immunisation. If the possible cause of an AEFI is not clearly iden-
tified, or if the event occurred in temporal association with immu-
nisation, the patient who experiences the event may assume that
the vaccine was the cause. Allegations that vaccines may cause
an AEFI must be dealt with diligently and either confirmed or
refuted based on scientific evidence. Misleading data can rapidly
undermine confidence in an individual vaccine, or can lead to
groundless suspension or withdrawal of the product from the mar-
ket; ultimately having dramatic consequences for public health
including decreased coverage and disease resurgence (Table 2). In
some cases it takes a long time after an AEFI is reported to generate
sufficient scientific data to determine that the AEFI was not caused
by the vaccine; such as the unfounded fears that measles-mumps-
rubella vaccine (MMR) caused autism or that whole-cell pertussis
vaccines caused encephalopathy [3,4].
Vaccine safety is monitored and assessed by multiple parties
and at many levels. For example, there is a constant effort made
from a programmatic/public health perspective by authorities such
as the World health Organization (WHO) and its safety committee
(GACVS), and other supranational and national organizations to
strengthen National Regulatory Authorities, favouring the estab-
lishment of National Immunisation Advisory Groups, safety
surveillance, etc. Moreover, large epidemiologic studies and post-
marketing surveillance are increasingly targeted to refine the ben-
efits versus risk of vaccines. However, these aspects will not be the
focus of this review.
Among all stakeholders, healthcare providers play an important
role which includes identifying AEFI, collecting all available clinicalinformation relating to the AEFI, and reporting the event, including
any evaluation of risk factors that may have contributed to the
event.
Here we review the procedures that are in place for monitoring
vaccine safety and establishing causality, focusing on the health-
care provider’s role in these processes. We also examine difficulties
in AEFI reporting faced by healthcare providers in some parts of the
world, and propose improvements in vaccine safety monitoring for
the global community.
2. Infrastructure for monitoring vaccine safety
Before a vaccine is administered to humans, vaccine manufac-
turers undertake extensive safety evaluation of individual vaccine
components and of the final formulation to be administered. Raw
materials must be of the highest possible purity and quality (or
‘clinical grade’), their origin must be properly traced and their
ongoing supply must be guaranteed [5]. The vaccine components
and the final product are tested in the laboratory for purity, steril-
ity, potency, consistency, activity and stability (described in more
detail by [46]). Many of these tests are conducted in the laboratory,
and many, such as tests for efficacy, toxicity, safety and effects on
reproductive health, are conducted in animal models.
After licensure, all vaccine lots must pass a rigorous array of
quality control tests that are agreed on by regulatory agencies
(both the authority responsible for the jurisdiction where the man-
ufacturer is based, and the authority [or authorised delegate] on
the receiving country), before they can be released. During manu-
facturing an individual vaccine will undergo multiple non-clinical,
toxicology and safety tests (sometimes numbering in the hun-
dreds) before being released for use in humans. New production
sites need to be inspected and approved before starting their activ-
ities, after which they are regularly inspected and audited by reg-
ulatory agencies. Production sites can undergo many inspections in
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6674 A. Di Pasquale et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 6672–6680a year, since each individual country’s authorities may decide to
inspect the facilities at any time.
The safety of an individual vaccine is continuously monitored in
humans throughout its clinical development, culminating in large
Phase III studies which may be designed to assess specific safety
outcomes (Garçon et al. in this issue). Although smaller pre-
licensure safety packages may be submitted in settings of public
emergency, such as pandemic influenza, or with new vaccine for-
mulations of existing vaccines, most new vaccines are submitted
for license approval with an extensive safety data package contain-
ing detailed safety information from pre-clinical studies and from
the thousands or even tens of thousands of individuals that
received the vaccine in clinical trials. Nevertheless, the possible
occurrence of extremely rare AEs, AEs with a delayed onset, or
AEs in populations that have not been studied during vaccine
development, are unlikely to be detected and assessed until the
vaccine is used more widely in the general population.
License applications are supported by the development of a Risk
Management Plan (RMP) or Pharmacovigilance Planning [6], in
which important safety risks are identified and actions designed
to address these concerns [7]. The objectives of the Pharmacovigi-
lance Plan are to specify what is, and is not, known about the safety
of a vaccine at the time of license application. This information is
intended to help industry and regulators identify any need for
specific data collection and to further characterise the safety risks
post-authorisation. When necessary, the Pharmacovigilance Plan
will define appropriate measures to minimise known (identified)
or potential risks to individuals (prevent an AE or reduce its sever-
ity, should it occur) and to monitor the success of those measures
(Table 3). The Pharmacovigilance Plan can include additional clin-
ical trials, epidemiological studies, database analyses, pregnancy
registries and post-authorisation safety studies, any of which
may be voluntary or mandated by the licensing authority [8]. Inde-
pendent studies also add to the wealth of information gathered by
authorities and industry [9,10].
2.1. Passive safety surveillance
Passive surveillance is an important source of post-licensure
safety information [11,12]. Passive surveillance relies on individu-
als to report AEFI when they become aware of them. Many coun-
tries have regional or centralised infrastructure and procedures
in place to receive AEFI reports from healthcare providers and
the public (Table 4). AEFI reports can also be sent directly to the
relevant pharmaceutical company, which receives all reports of
AEFI that could concern their products, and holds large safety data-
bases of information that are queried regularly for signal detection
and evaluation. Safety signals are assessed using all relevant
sources of safety data and are scrutinised to determine if there is
sufficient evidence demonstrating causal association to immunisa-
tion, or a new aspect of a previously identified association.
Information received through passive AE reporting can be diffi-
cult to interpret. Reporting of all AEs after immunisation is encour-
aged, but whether or not an individual makes a report can be
influenced by the severity of the AE, past experience with the pro-
duct, other similar reports highlighted by media attention, the
temporal relationship of the event with immunisation, a pre-
conception of a causal association, knowledge of, or ease of access
to reporting forms. The quality of information provided may be
insufficient to either confirm the diagnosis, or assess the likelihood
of a causal association. Underreporting is a well-recognised limita-
tion of passive surveillance systems [13].
Regional, national and supranational organizations, as well as
vaccine manufacturers, use a variety of statistical methods to con-
duct data mining activities searching for potential safety signals
[14]. The availability of electronic safety databases has seen the
Table 3
Examples of the goals of safety investigations that can be included in the Risk Management Plan.
Goal Example Investigated using
Introduce a new vaccine when
there is an identified risk for
similar vaccines
Febrile convulsion following quadrivalent measles-mumps-
rubella and varicella vaccines
Clinical trials, post-licensure observational studies
Investigate a potential risk
identified prior to registration
Risk of spontaneous abortion when adjuvanted human
papillomavirus vaccines are inadvertently administered in early
pregnancy
Clinical trial adverse event reports, post-licensure
observational studies
Investigate a theoretical risk Immune-mediated diseases following adjuvanted vaccines such
as adjuvanted human papillomavirus vaccine, adjuvanted
pandemic influenza vaccines
Clinical trials, case-control, retrospective and prospective
cohort studies, adverse event reports, post-licensure
surveillance activities
Introduce new vaccines to new
target populations when safety
data are scarce
Adjuvanted pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccine in pregnancy, in
immune-compromised
Clinical trial, case-control, retrospective and prospective cohort
studies adverse event reports, post-licensure surveillance
activities
Introduce new vaccines when
available pharmacovigilance
infrastructure is limited
Malaria vaccine in Africa. Dengue vaccine in developing
countries in Africa, and Asia Pacific
Clinical trials and infrastructure development to allow
observational studies to establish rates of adverse events
before and after vaccine introduction
Responding to a potential safety
signal after authorisation
Narcolepsy reported in temporal association with the use of
AS03-adjuvanted pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccine
(PandemrixTM)
Post-licensure surveillance activities, retrospective and
prospective cohort studies
Guillain-Barre Syndrome after conjugated meningococcal
serogroups ACWY vaccine MenactraTM
Multiple sclerosis after HBV immunisation
A. Di Pasquale et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 6672–6680 6675development of sophisticated tools to detect and analyse AEs of
special interest. For example, the incidence of specific AEs occur-
ring within a specified timeframe after immunisation can be com-
pared with the incidence of the same AE in the whole surveillance
database. Alternatively, when knowledge of the background rates
of disease is known (i.e., the incidence of the disease in the general
population), ‘Observed-versus-Expected’ analyses can be used to
determine if the AEFI is occurring at a higher rate in vaccinees than
expected in the general population.
Post-licensure safety surveillance allows the assessment of
safety when the product is administered to large populations,
increasing the ability to detect rare, serious AEs. For example,
intussusception is a rare condition that may occur during infancy.
A small number of cases of intussusception in young infants occur-
ring during the week after immunisation were reported to a pas-
sive surveillance system with the first licensed oral rotavirus
vaccine (Rotashield, Wyeth). In response to these reports, the
immunisation programme with this vaccine was suspended pend-
ing further investigations. The US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) performed two large investigations; they esti-
mated that RotaShield vaccine increased the risk for intussuscep-
tion by one or two cases per 10,000 infants vaccinated [15]. The
manufacturer voluntarily withdrew the vaccine from the market
[16]. These data informed the design of subsequent clinical trials
of new rotavirus vaccines. These trials required large sample sizes
to be able to rule out an intussusception risk of the same magni-
tude. Several years after these studies, post-licensure active safety
surveillance data of the two available rotavirus vaccines from
international settings identified a lower intussusception risk of
currently available rotavirus vaccines; estimated at 1 to
2/100,000 vaccinated infants [17].3. The healthcare provider’s role in monitoring vaccine safety
Industry, regulatory agencies, academia, the medical commu-
nity and the public have a shared responsibility in monitoring vac-
cine safety. However, early detection and management of an AEFI
will most often fall first to frontline general practitioners and other
vaccine providers. Healthcare professionals have a key role in pre-
venting AEFI: for example, syncope-related injuries, vaccine
administration errors and serious allergic reactions to vaccine
components can usually be prevented through careful history-taking and by having adequate procedures in place before and dur-
ing vaccine administration. Healthcare professionals also need to
recognise individuals for whom certain vaccines are contraindi-
cated: such as live viral vaccines in severely immunocompromised
patients or during pregnancy. Some AEFIs may occur well after the
immunisation event (for example the risk of intussusception may
increase slightly for up to 31 days after immunisation with oral
rotavirus vaccine), requiring additional vigilance to identify the
event as an AEFI. Other AEFI such as anaphylaxis frequently occur
rapidly after exposure to the allergen and are anticipated to have
an onset <1 h after immunisation, requiring observation of vaccine
recipients. Anaphylaxis needs to be differentiated from other acute
events that may also occur soon after immunisation with similar
presenting symptoms and signs; such as vasovagal reactions, psy-
chogenic or conversion symptoms.
Healthcare providers are encouraged to report AEFIs via local
reporting processes (Table 4). All AEFI reports from all sources
worldwide are sent to the relevant manufacturer and entered into
the central safety database. All serious AEFIs are individually
assessed and more information may be requested from the individ-
ual who reported the AEFI. All efforts are made to obtain a com-
plete medical record of the AEFI including the results of
diagnostic tests and treatments administered. It is important that
medical information of high quality is collected to allow diagnostic
certainty and to perform causality assessment of individual cases.
While a temporal relationship to immunisation or a series of sim-
ilar AEFIs in vaccinated individuals may suggest causality, proving
causality is much more difficult and other evidence is required
[18].3.1. Cause or coincidence? How to assess the true relationship between
vaccines and events occurring after immunisation
Since many events may occur in temporal association with
vaccine administration, it is important to know and perform all
the steps needed to investigate whether an event was causally
associated with vaccination or if the association was merely coin-
cidental (i.e., another factor occurring at the same time was the
real cause). Sometimes the aetiology remains unknown or very
hard to determine.
Safety surveillance systems are correctly intended to be as
sensitive as possible to detect signals that trigger further
Table 4
Examples of national infrastructure for reporting adverse events following immunisation.
Country Surveillance system Organization Link
United States Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
(VAERS)
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention; Food and Drug
Administration
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/
ensuringsafety/monitoring/vaers/index.html
Canada Canadian Adverse Events Following
Immunisation
Public Health Agency of Canada http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/im/aefi-essi-form-eng.php
United Kingdom Yellow Card Scheme Medicines & Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency
https://yellowcard.mhra.gov.uk/
Australia Australian Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting
System
Therapeutic Goods Administration https://www.tga.gov.au/reporting-medicine-and-
vaccine-adverse-events
Belgium Belgian Centre for Pharmacovigilance for
Medicines for Human Use
Federal Agency for Medicines and
Health Products
http://www.fagg-afmps.be/en/items-HOME/
notification_adverse_reactions/
Italy Italian Pharmacovigilance Adverse Event
Spontaneous Reporting System
Italian Medicines Agency http://www.agenziafarmaco.gov.it/it/content/rete-
nazionale-di-farmacovigilanza
Singapore Health Sciences Authority Health Sciences Authority http://www.hsa.gov.sg/content/hsa/en/Health_
Products_Regulation/Safety_Information_and_Product_
Recalls/Report_Adverse_Events_related_to_health_
products.html
Hong Kong Pharmacovigilance Unit Drug Office, Department of Health http://www.drugoffice.gov.hk/eps/do/en/healthcare_
providers/adr_reporting/reporting_guideline.html
China China Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring
System
China Food and Drug Administration http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0756/
Thailand National Adverse Product Reaction Monitoring
Centre
Thai Food and Drug Administration http://www.fda.moph.go.th/eng/index.stm
Japan Pharmaceuticals and Medical Device Agency Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare
http://www.pmda.go.jp/english/
Israel Pharmacology Department Ministry of Health http://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/
PharmAndCosmetics/Pages/side_effects_reports.aspx
Turkey Turkey Pharmacovigilance Centre Ministry of Health General
Directorate for Pharmaceuticals and
Pharmacy
http://beta.titck.gov.tr/UnitsPageDescription.aspx?
BirimId=qNbDt1uv/1w=
Poland Office for Registration of Medicinal Products,
Medical Devices and Biocidal Products
Polish Regulatory Authority http://www.urpl.gov.pl/pl
Russia Federal Service for the Supervision of Public
Health
Russian Ministry of Health http://www.roszdravnadzor.ru/en/drugs/monitpringlp
Brazil Consumer Accidents Information System Ministry of Health http://siac.justica.gov.br/
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between the AEFI and the vaccine administration.
Many methods have been proposed to assess the potential rela-
tionship between a medicine and an AE in a given patient, ranging
from short questionnaires, guidelines and algorithms, which have
been developed to promote systematic and standardised assess-
ment of causality [19,20]. A standardised algorithm has been
developed by Neal Halsey et al. (Clinical Immunisation Safety
Assessment network, US) to assist in data collection, interpretation,
and in assessing causality after individual AEFIs (http://jhsph.co1.
qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0ffGju4La9Hjf8h) [20,21]. The first step
is to establish a firm diagnosis of the AEFI using accepted clinical
case definitions. A fundamental contribution to this end is the
ongoing work of the Brighton Collaboration, a network of scientists
whose aim is to establish clear case definitions for individual AEFIs
so that reports from all parts of the world are comparable and
reporting consistency is ensured [22,23]. The second step is the
determination of whether the time that elapsed between the
administration of the vaccine and the onset of symptoms is consis-
tent with current knowledge about possible causal relationships.
For example, if an immunological mechanism is thought to be
implicated in an AEFI (for instance, Guillain-Barré syndrome),
and the event is reported 1–2 days after the administration of
the first dose of a vaccine, the time interval is not compatible with
a causal relationship with immunisation simply because more time
(several days or even several weeks) is needed to induce the
immune-pathological condition. Similarly, a concomitant infection
should be investigated as the most likely cause of febrile seizures
occurring 2 days after the administration of a MMR/MMRV vac-
cine, since it is well known that live-attenuated viruses are muchmore likely to be responsible for febrile seizures 5–12 days after
administration.
The possibility of contamination of the vaccine lot by chemicals,
toxins or infectious agents should be considered in certain con-
texts. In these cases, it is expected that the event would be
reported in a considerable number of recipients of the suspected
contaminated vaccine lots. Moreover, if contamination is investi-
gated, the responsible organism or substance should be detected
in the residual content of the vaccine vial. If an attenuated vaccine
agent is responsible for an AEFI, the agent or its nucleic acid should
be found in the damaged tissues, and the sequencing of its deoxyri-
bonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) should correspond
to the vaccine strain.
Even when the time interval is compatible with a possible role
of the vaccine, all alternative potential causes of the event need to
be investigated (step 3). This is of critical importance on two
counts: firstly, in order to decide whether the next vaccine dose
can be administered; secondly, although often difficult, to deter-
mine what was the likely cause. A ‘temporal factor’ may prejudice
the conclusion that the vaccine is the cause, simply because it pre-
ceded the event. By failing to look for alternative explanations,
potentially treatable causes may go unrecognised, patients may
not receive the full immunisation series, and the vaccine will be
inappropriately blamed for the AE.
Finally, healthcare providers are encouraged to report all AEFIs
to their local surveillance systems because these reports are funda-
mental to generate hypotheses for further investigation. Timely
reporting and a complete evaluation of AEFI are critical in order
to maintain public confidence in vaccines, and to highlight the true
rare AEFIs when they occur. Vaccines have an excellent safety
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vention. Accurate and complete safety information puts vaccine
attributable AEFIs into perspective, thus allowing health providers
to correctly weigh the benefits and risks of their implementation.
3.2. When causality is not established
The perception of a relationship between a vaccine and serious
AE can have profound effects on vaccine confidence, leading to
widespread rejection of some vaccines, with devastating conse-
quences (Table 2). Changing these perceptions is highly challeng-
ing and requires the communication of up-to-date and detailed
information to providers and their patients, for maintaining trust
in vaccines. For example, a gastroenterologist claimed a causal
association between MMR immunisation and autism when he
investigated a series of patients with autism of whom 8 out of 12
had onset of symptoms within 2 weeks of immunisation [24,25].
This assertion was made in 1998 and since then, dozens of studies
and several data reviews by independent organizations have all
concluded that there is no evidence to support a causal association
between MMR immunisation and autism. However, 17 years later
there are still fears within the public that MMR immunisation will
cause autism.
For other purported vaccine-AEFI associations, it is frequently
the case that despite extensive efforts and large investigative stud-
ies, a causal association between an AEFI and immunisation can
neither be proven nor ruled out. This may be due to very low fre-
quency of the AEFI, inability to exclude alternative causes, or both.
Under these circumstances, attempts are made to quantify the
level of certainty of any potential association using statistical
methods.
3.3. Steps once causality is established
When a causal association between an AEFI and immunisation
is established, or if a causal association is suspected but not estab-
lished and the AEFI is potentially serious, the benefit versus risk is
re-assessed. Decisions are made regarding AEFI management and
whether future vaccine doses should be administered. Risk man-
agement and risk minimisation strategies, such as changes to the
Prescribing Information, identification of measures to reduce the
risk to vaccinees, product suspension or withdrawal, are under-Naonal/region
authories
Detecon
Reports of AEFIs
Validaon
Caused by the vaccine?
Healthca
professio
Public
No Yes/not known
Fig. 1. Continual evaluation of adverstaken. National Technical Advisory Groups and National Regula-
tory Agencies also play a key role in evaluating and acting upon
new safety information after it is received. Accurate safety infor-
mation and risk minimisation strategies are communicated in a
timely manner to healthcare providers through changes to the Pre-
scribing Information or by direct communications to doctors.
The evaluation of AEFIs is continuous. There is a constant circu-
lar process of gathering safety data, analysing the data for signals,
determining if signals impact the benefit-risk profile of the vaccine
and taking actions as appropriate (Fig. 1). This feedback mecha-
nism works to change immunisation practices and has led to
improvements in vaccine safety (Fig. 2).
3.4. The Prescribing Information
The safety information that appears in the Prescribing Informa-
tion represents a summary of data obtained from clinical trials and
post-marketing surveillance reports. In clinical trials, all symptoms
that occur at the vaccine injection site are considered to be
vaccine-related, while the investigator running the trial indepen-
dently assesses the causal association between all other AEFI that
are reported. All AEFI reported in clinical trials that are considered
to be at least possibly related to the vaccine, that are biologically
plausible (for example, fractures are a common occurrence in
childhood but it is not biologically plausible that they are directly
caused by immunisation), and that are reported after at least 0.1%
of doses, are included in the Prescribing Information. Similarly,
series’ of AEFI reports from global sources are included if a causal
relationship is biologically plausible and reported after at least
0.1% of doses. AEFIs are described in the Prescribing Information
as ‘‘very common” if they are reported after at least 1 in every 10
doses (such as pain and redness at the infection site), ‘‘common”
between 1 in every 10–100 doses, ‘‘uncommon” between 1:100–
1000 doses, ‘‘rare” between 1:1000–10,000 doses and ‘‘very rare”
if reported less frequently than 1:10,000 doses (such as
Vaccine-associated-paralytic-poliomyelitis after live oral polio
virus vaccine which has an overall risk of 1:1,000,000 [26].
The Prescribing Information and accompanying patient infor-
mation sheet are updated as required to reflect the most recent
safety information (Fig. 1). Events that might trigger an update of
the safety information in the Prescribing Information include the
availability of new data that allow the removal of contraindicationsal
Acon
addional
warnings, restricted use
Interpretaon
Change in beneﬁt:risk?
No change in use
re 
nals
Manufacturers
Yes No
e events reported by authorities.
Change to Undesirable Eﬀects
Thrombocytopenia is a well-recognised 
complicaon of many viral infecons including 
measles and rubella.  Post-licensure studies 
conﬁrmed an increased risk of thrombocytopenia 
aer MMR vaccinaon, although the risk was 
lower and disease clinically milder than aer 
natural infecon. Thrombocytopenia was added as 
a very rare  undesirable eﬀect in the Prescribing 
Informaon
Change to Warnings and Precauons 
Syncope may occur aer administraon of any 
vaccine to adolescents and adults.  Syncope has 
been reported following vaccinaon of adolescent 
and young women with human papillomavirus 
(HPV) vaccines, and has a plausible relaonship 
given the populaon and the sengs where 
vaccinaon is given (e.g., schools). Although not 
unique to HPV vaccines,  syncope  was added to 
the Prescribing Informaon to alert prescribers to 
take preventave measures and to closely observe 
subjects for 15 minutes aer vaccinaon
Change to the Schedule
Post-licensure studies have established that oral 
rotavirus vaccine is associated with a small 
increase in the background risk of 
intussuscepon. Intussuscepon is most 
common in children aged 6-12 months. Risk 
minimisaon is achieved by compleng the 
vaccinaon course before 6 months of age
PMS can lead to changes in 
the Prescribing Informaon
Fig. 2. Recent examples where post-marketing surveillance (PMS) has led to updates of the Prescribing Information.
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reported through post-marketing surveillance mechanisms; or
the addition of warnings or strategies to minimise risk to vulnera-
ble populations (Fig. 2). Sometimes the Prescribing Information
will be updated because of the existence of a ‘class effect’ (the
effect is observed in all vaccines or similar vaccines).4. Adopting a global approach to vaccine safety
Over the last 10–15 years there have been many initiatives
undertaken and infrastructure developed to improve assessment
of vaccine safety [12]. Collaborative projects monitor and evaluate
vaccine safety independently of industry: for example, the Vaccine
Safety Datalink is a collaboration between the US CDC and 9
healthcare organizations [27]; the Institute of Medicine is a non-
government Organization in the US [28]; the Vaccine Adverse
Event Surveillance & Communication is a collaboration of regula-
tory agencies, public health institutes and scientists that aims to
improve safety monitoring including the conduct of safety studies
within Europe [29]; the Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine
Safety is an independent expert clinical and scientific advisory
body that advises the World Health Organization on vaccine safety
issues of potential global importance [30]; and there are other sys-
tems in place in North America, Europe and parts of Asia [31]. Con-
versely, the importance of surveillance of AEFI has not always been
widely recognised in low- and middle-income countries. For exam-
ple, in April 1998, AEFI following diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vac-
cine in one governorate in Egypt were reported by the media
before medical authorities were informed, resulting in panic over
immunisation and a reduction in coverage of all vaccines in the
immunisation programme. A surveillance program was subse-
quently established in July 1998 [32]. The program has received
2000 reports until 2015 and the consequences appropriately man-aged (personal communication from unpublished reports by the
Ministry of Health in Egypt).
In addition, regulatory agencies provide guidelines for safety
monitoring of vaccines at all stages of their development and for
the entire duration of their use [33].
Nonetheless, it is estimated that the majority of low-and-
middle income countries do not have post-marketing safety
surveillance infrastructure in place, and there remains a need to
build a global platform for vaccine safety monitoring and commu-
nication efforts [34]. Such a platform would facilitate detection of
rare AEFIs across countries and rapid deployment of risk minimisa-
tion measures. In resource-poor settings where the establishment
of safety monitoring infrastructure is not immediately possible,
global infrastructure has an important role to play, particularly
for new vaccines intended primarily for use in resource-poor coun-
tries (such as malaria and dengue vaccines). In 2011 the World
Health Organization launched the Global Vaccine Safety Blueprint,
a project to achieve effective vaccine pharmacovigilance systems in
all countries [30] and which is developing standardised tools such
as the Global Manual On Surveillance Of Adverse Events Following
Immunisation [35], to build vaccine pharmacovigilance capacity in
low- and middle-income countries.5. Conclusions
The benefit-risk profile of each vaccine is assessed constantly
during the entire duration of its use. Increased knowledge of the
safety surveillance processes that are in place to collect, analyse
and communicate around AEFI can increase confidence of health-
care providers and the public in immunisation. Healthcare provi-
ders have a central role in enhancing knowledge of vaccine
safety by ensuring AEFI are identified quickly, that high-quality
data is collected to allow thorough assessment of the AE, and to
A. Di Pasquale et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 6672–6680 6679determine the likelihood that immunisation may have been (or
not) the cause of the event. Ultimately these events should be
reported via national pathways. The ability to detect and commu-
nicate AEFI is not adequate in all countries, but could be improved
with a global approach to vaccine safety monitoring. Prescribing
information leaflets are regularly updated to inform the healthcare
provider and vaccine recipients about the most recent assessment
of benefits and AEFI. These activities help to maintain public trust
in vaccines, the ultimate objective being to have vaccines with the
most favourable benefit-risk profile.
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